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The purpose of this work was to perform FMEDA for the safety module developed in the 
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The safety module acts as an adapter between a PLC and the drive while supporting 
PROFINET functions, as well as PROFIsafe over PROFINET. The safety module has one 
safety function: STO.  
 
The device was designed and developed to be able to perform up to SIL3 level according to 
IEC 61508:2010 and performance level PL E according to ISO 13849:2015. 
Throughout this work, the safety device’s electronic circuitry will be analysed in order to 
ensure that it meets the design requirements from failure probability perspective. 
   
The safety device will be a common option for the drive families that support F-series field-
bus adapter and has a built-in STO circuit (ACS880, ACS580 and ACS380). It is anticipated 
that the device will be released to public during Autumn 2017. 
 
Following this thesis, fault insertion testing will be carried out to validate the results achieved 
in the FMEDA. In addition, a thorough report summarizing the FMEDA results will be written 
and submitted to a certified body for safety integrity level and performance level certification 
as a part of the design documentation. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Functional safety plays a vital and growing role in the industry aiming to minimize poten-
tial hazards and risks. Due to lethal industrial incidents and disasters witnessed in the 
past, regulations and rules have been formed to help in risk assessment and prevention. 
  
With the increasing need of electrical/electronic/programmable-electronic safety-related 
systems, new standards had to be introduced to meet the new requirements and de-
mands. In the EU, two standards are mainly followed: IEC 61508:2010 and ISO 
13849:2015. These standards will be overviewed later. 
 
The goal of this thesis was to perform a failure modes, effects, and diagnostic analysis 
(FMEDA) for the safety device developed in the PESTO project for ABB Oy. FMEDA is 
a systematic process used in the development stage of a product to ensure that it meets 
the pre-determined safety requirements. In the FMEDA, each component is analysed for 
possible failures and the consequences of these failures on the system. 
 
Before heading to the FMEDA process, a general understanding of the safety levels, 
terms, and system architectures are a necessity. This work will provide the reader with 
a brief introduction to functional safety and the elementary knowledge required to under-
stand the FMEDA procedure and its results.  
 
In chapter 2, functional safety will be discussed. The terms commonly used will be pre-
sented and explained. In addition, IEC 61508 and ISO 13849 standards will be intro-
duced. 
 
In chapter 3, different safety system architectures will be explained and compared. The 
formulas to be used in each architecture will be presented as well. 
 
Chapter 4 will focus on safety functions and provide several examples of different safety 
functions used in the industry. 
 
Chapter 5 will provide an overview of the safety module developed in the PESTO project. 
The electronics and safety architecture used in the project will be discussed as well.  
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Chapter 6 will introduce the FMEDA analysis, the way it is applied for different compo-
nents, and fault insertion testing method. 
 
In chapter 7, the results achieved from the FMEDA analysis will be presented and a 
conclusion for this work will be given. 
 
In appendix 1, argumentation for the β and βD factors is given. 
 
Finally, in appendix 2, failure rates and modes for FSB-21 are shown. 
2 Functional Safety 
 
Industrial machines, process plants and equipment may fail in a way that people are put 
at risk of harm. Failures may arise through random hardware failures, systematic failures 
and common cause failures. Functional safety is part of the overall safety of a system or 
a product used to perform safety function/s. Failure to carry out the safety function might 
lead to an immediate increase in the risks. 
 
Functional safety levels are determined in several international standards. IEC 61508 
and ISO 13849 are the main standards used in the machinery sector.  
 
To determine the compliance of a product with specific standards and performance levels 
requirements created to protect against potential risks, injuries, and in the worst case, 
human death, a functional safety assessment shall be carried out. 
 
To understand the difference between the two standards, few necessary terms will be 
presented. 
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2.1 Terms  
 
2.1.1 Safety Instrumented System (SIS) 
 
Safety Instrumented System is used to implement one or several safety functions (More 
about safety functions in chapter 4). 
 
SIS, as shown in Figure 1 below, referred to as Electrical / Electronic / Programmable 
Electronic Safety-Related System in IEC 61508, is generally made up of three parts: 
I. Sensor/Input interface: such as switches, sensors, signals 
II. Logic solver: such as PLC, microprocessor. 
III. Final element/Output interface: such as valve, pump. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Safety Instrumented System structure 
 
2.1.2 Failure rate and modes 
 
A failure arises when a component/device fails to perform its intended function. Failure 
rate, denoted as λ (Lambda), is a measure of reliability that gives the number of failures 
per unit time as shown in equation (1) below. Failure rate has the unit of 1/h and it is a 
common practise to use the unit of “failures per milliard (109) hours”, denoted as FIT. [1] 
 
𝜆 =
𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
     (1) 
 
Failure rate calculations are based on complex models that take into account factors 
such as temperature, environment and stress. 
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Failures are classified as safe failures and dangerous failures as shown in Figure 2 be-
low. 
 
Figure 2 – Safe and Dangerous Failures 
 
Safe Failure: A failure of a safety instrumented function component that has no effect 
on the ability of the system reaching to a safe state. 
 
Dangerous Failure: A failure of a safety instrumented function component that has the 
potential in preventing the system from being able to reach fail-safe state when re-
quested to do so. 
 
Safe and dangerous failures are divided into two categories each as shown in Figure 3 
below.  
 
Figure 3 – Failure Modes 
 
Safe Detected Failure (SD): A not dangerous failure that is detected by the SIS diag-
nostics. 
 
Safe Undetected Failure (SU): A not dangerous failure that is not detected by the SIS 
diagnostics. 
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Dangerous Detected Failure (DD): A dangerous failure that is detected by the SIS di-
agnostics and which could possibly lead to a loss of a safety function. 
  
Dangerous Undetected Failure (DU): A dangerous failure that is not detected by the 
SIS diagnostics and which could possibly lead to the loss of a safety function. This type 
of failures is regarded as the most dangerous failure and SIS designers put efforts to 
minimize them.  
 
Electronic components follow the well-known bathtub curve shown below in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4 – The Bathtub Curve 
 
The bathtub curve is divided into 3 sections: 
 
Infant mortality: Many components fail as soon as they are put into use. The component 
might fail immediately or within a short time and generally, a defect or bad designs are 
the causes. The failure rate during this phase is relatively high. Manufacturers eliminate 
these failures with a ”burn in” period in which the components are put into use in similar 
conditions as they are intended to be used. 
 
Useful lifetime: If a component doesn’t fail in the first stage, it tends to perform as ex-
pected during it is expected lifetime. The failure rate during this stage is typically low and 
constant. 
 
End of life/Wear out: After a component passes its expected lifetime, it starts wearing 
out and the failures start increasing.  
  
Throughout this work, failure rates are assumed to be constant. 
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2.1.3 Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) 
 
Hardware fault tolerance is a term used in IEC 61508. HFT describes the ability of a 
system to continue carrying out the required safety function in the presence of one or 
more faults in its hardware. 
 
A system having a hardware fault tolerance of N means that N+1 faults could cause the 
system to be unable to undertake the safety function. 
 
When the safety architecture is known and it is expressed as MooN (M out of N), HFT 
can be simply calculated by N - M. In some cases, the term HFT is used to express 
whether a system has redundancy or not. This usage might create some confusion as 
HFT ≠ Redundancy. 
 
2.1.4 Diagnostic Coverage (DC) 
 
Diagnostic coverage is a term used in both standards and it describes the diagnostics 
ability of the safety system to detect dangerous failures out of the total number of dan-
gerous failures. The DC is given in percentage (0-99%), which is then evaluated for every 
component separately. 
 
As per ISO 13849-1, the average DC of a system can be calculated using the following 
formula: 
 
𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑔 =
∑
𝐷𝐶𝑖
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐷𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑
1
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐷𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
     (2) 
 
Where DCi is a single component’s diagnostic coverage and MTTFDi is a single compo-
nent’s mean time to dangerous failure. 
 
IEC 61508 describes diagnostic coverage with the following formula as well 
 
𝐷𝐶 =
∑𝜆𝐷𝐷
∑𝜆𝐷𝐷+∑𝜆𝐷𝑈
=
∑𝜆𝐷𝐷
∑𝜆𝐷
      (3) 
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In both standards, DC is classified in 4 categories as shown in the Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1 – Diagnostic Coverage Classification, modified from IEC 61508 [2] 
 
A higher value of DC represents a system with better diagnostics ability. 
 
2.1.5 Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) 
 
Safe Failure Fraction is a measure of the effectiveness of the built-in diagnostics. The 
safe failure fraction is similar to diagnostic coverage but additionally, it accounts for the 
tendency of the system to fail towards a safe state. SFF is presented in percentage and 
is given with the following formula 
 
𝑆𝐹𝐹 =
∑𝜆𝑆𝐷+∑𝜆𝑆𝑈+∑𝜆𝐷𝐷
∑𝜆𝑆𝐷+∑𝜆𝑆𝑈+∑𝜆𝐷𝐷+∑𝜆𝐷𝑈
=
∑𝜆𝑆+∑𝜆𝐷𝐷
∑𝜆𝑆+∑𝜆𝐷
= 1 −
∑𝜆𝐷𝑈
∑𝜆
   (4) 
 
In words: The ratio of sum of safe failures (detected and undetected) plus the dangerous 
detected failures by the total number of all failures (safe and dangerous). Figure 5 below 
illustrated the SFF. 
 
Figure 5 – Safe Failure Fraction (The green part in the pie chart) 
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2.1.6 Low Demand Mode and High Demand Mode 
 
The IEC 61508 defines two fundamental operation modes: 
 
 Demand mode: Also known as low demand mode. According to the IEC 61508 
standard, it is defined as the mode in which the demands to activate the safety-
instrumented function (SIF) are less than once per year (<1 per year).   
 
 Continuous mode: Also known as high demand mode. According to the IEC 
61508 standard, it is defined as the mode in which the demands to activate the 
SIF are more frequent compared to the low demand mode (>1 per year). 
 
As can be understood from above, the difference between the operation modes is how 
often the safety-instrumented function is called into action. 
 
2.1.7 Common Cause Failure (CCF) 
 
A common cause failure (CCF) is a failure in which a single fault results in the failure of 
multiple components. Safety Instrumented Systems generally provide several ad-
vantages such as flexibility and diagnostics abilities. At the same time, there are many 
challenges when using a SIS. Some of these challenges are due to dependencies as a 
result of common design methods, same environment, operation, and maintenance pro-
cedures. 
 
Both standards, IEC 61508 and ISO 13849, take into account CCF in the design process 
of a SIS. They provide means to evaluate how well the SIS is designed to cope with 
CCF.  
 
IEC 61508 introduces the common cause factors β and βD that are part of the probability 
of dangerous failure per hour (PFH) calculation formulas. The β factor provides the frac-
tion of undetected dangerous failures that have a common cause while the βD provides 
the fraction of detected dangerous failures that have a common cause [2]. To determine 
the value of β and βD, several safety-related questions must be answered. These ques-
tions are related to the safety circuit design, analysis and environmental factors. A posi-
tive answer grants points for the X and Y variables. It is important to note that there are 
9 
 
different X and Y variables for the different subsystems. When all questions have been 
answered, the following formulas can be used: 
 
− 𝑆 = 𝑋 + 𝑌  (To obtain the value of β)    (5) 
 
− 𝑆𝐷 = 𝑋(𝑍 + 1) + 𝑌  (To obtain the value of βD)   (6)
       
To determine the value of Z, two tables, Table D.2 and Table D.3 are provided in the 
standard IEC 61508:6. (These tables aren’t provided in this work) 
 
After calculating the values of S and SD, the following table is used to determine the 
values of β and βD: 
 
Table 2 – β and βD factors, reprinted from IEC 61508[2] 
Score (S or SD) Corresponding value of β and βD for the 
Logic subsystem Sensors or final el-
ements 
120 or above 0.5% 1% 
70 to 120 1% 2% 
45 to 70 2% 5% 
Less than 45 5% 10% 
 
In more complicated system architectures the value of β and βD have to be adjusted 
according to table D.5 in IEC 61508:6 (not provided in this work). 
 
ISO 13849 provides a table (Table F.1, not provided in this work) that lists six groups of 
measures against CCF. Each group is aimed to different aspect in the design and use of 
the product such as separation, diversity and environmental factors. Similar to IEC 
61508, points are granted if the conditions mentioned in each group are met. The maxi-
mum achievable points are 100. The value achieved is not used in any formula but it is 
a prerequisite for meeting a specific performance level. The CCF evaluation is relevant 
only in Categories (Cat.) 2, 3 and 4.   
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2.1.8 Type A and B devices 
 
In IEC 61508 two types of elements are distinguished, type A and type B. The difference 
between the two lies in the complexity of the element, the level of confidence in under-
standing the failure modes of the components, the behaviour of the element under fault 
conditions and the failure data collected to provide confirmation of the theoretical analy-
sis.  
 
Type A elements are those with high level of confidence and are usually described as 
simple devices with well-known failure modes and a solid history of operation. 
Type B elements are those with low level of confidence and are usually described as 
complex devices with unknown failure modes such as microprocessors, ASICS, etc. [2] 
 
2.1.9 Average Probability of Failure, PFDG, PFHG 
 
Average Probability of Failure on Demand PFDG describes the mean probability of the 
system to fail dangerously and lose the ability to perform its safety function in low de-
mand mode.  
 
Average Probability of Failure per Hour PFHG describes the probability of the system to 
fail dangerously and lose the ability to perform its safety function in continuous mode. 
 
2.1.10 Proof test  
 
Proof test is a periodic test executed to confirm that a SIS is still capable of performing 
its intended safety function. The proof test detects dangerous undetected errors that are 
not found by the diagnostics. If necessary, a repair procedure can be carried out to re-
store the system to “as new”. 
  
2.1.11 Black Channel / White Channel 
 
Safety systems have evolved in recent years and the use of digital communication is 
becoming a norm. Digital communication adds flexibility, lower cost and safer means to 
implement a safety function. When such data communication is used, failure measures 
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shall be estimated accounting for transmission errors, data corruption, delays and other 
possible errors. In IEC 61508, two safety busses have been classified: 
 
White channel: The entire communication channel complies with IEC 61508 and IEC 
61784-3 or IEC 62280 
Black channel: Parts of the communications channel is not implemented according to 
IEC 61508 
 
Figure 6 below illustrates the difference between the two channels: 
 
 
Figure 6 – Architectures for data communication, reprinted from IEC 61508 [2] 
 
2.1.12 MTTF, MTBF, MTTR, MRT 
 
Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) is a reliability term used to describe the mean time ex-
pected until the first unit fails. It is a statistical value that provides the mean over a long 
time period. MTTF should be used with non-repairable device, while MTBF should be 
used with repairable device. MTTF is sometimes misunderstood as it is thought to mean 
the guaranteed minimum lifetime. 
 
Let’s take an example: 
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Table 3 – MTTF example 
Component 
(All similar) 
Time to Fail 
(Hours) 
1 1000 
2 1750 
3 1500 
4 1250 
5 2000 
 
In the example shown above in Table 3, the MTTF is calculated to be 1500 hours. How-
ever, a similar component can fail after 1000 hours. 
 
Mean Time between Failures (MTBF) is one of the most commonly used reliability terms 
in the industry as it provides the amount of failures per million hours for a component.  
 
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
=> 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 =
1
𝜆
   (7) 
 
Mean Time to Restoration (MTTR) is a term used to describe the time for a system to be 
restored into operation since the system failed. 
MTTR includes: 
I. Failure detection time 
II. Time spent until the repair took place 
III. The effective repair time 
IV. The time spent after the repair to put the component back into operation 
 
In many cases, failed hardware is not repaired and rather replaced. To minimize MTTR, 
companies usually keep spare parts. 
 
Mean Repair Time (MRT) is the time spent until the repair took place after the failure was 
detected until the system was back in order. MTR encompasses the times II+III+IV from 
MTTR. 
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2.1.13 Mean Time to Dangerous Failure - MTTFD  
 
Mean Time to Dangerous Failure MTTFD, previously denoted as MTTFd, is a term used 
in ISO 13849 and it can be easily mistaken for MTTF. The difference between the two is 
that MTTFD considers only the dangerous failures of the components.  
 
2.2 Functional Safety Standards 
 
IEC 61508 and ISO 13849 are the main standards used in the EU for functional safety 
in the machinery sector and are generally followed in designing and manufacturing of 
frequency inverters. 
 
While these standards have similar requirements, differences exist. These differences 
increase the efforts of the system-designer to meet the requirements of both standards. 
IEC 61508 uses safety integrity level (SIL) for functional safety levels whereas ISO 13849 
uses performance level (PL). While the functional safety levels given by the two stand-
ards seem to be different, similarities can be found. 
 
2.2.1 IEC 61508 and Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) 
 
IEC 61508 is an international standard for managing Functional Safety of Electrical / 
Electronic / Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems. The Standard has been 
developed through many years to meet the up-to-date requirements and demands. 
 
The standard provides a framework for: 
 Assessing the level of risk of the equipment under control and determining if the 
risk is acceptable. 
 Implementing a safety function for risk reduction in case the initial risk was not 
acceptable. 
 Providing means to prove that the safety instrumented system is able to provide 
the required protection. 
 
With varying levels of risk, different risk reductions majors are required for various sys-
tems. The standard provides 4 levels of risk reduction denoted by SIL (Safety Integrity 
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Level) with SIL 4 providing the highest degree of protection and SIL 1 providing the low-
est. SIL 4 is rarely used in the process industry and it is out of the scope of this work. 
  
To meet a specific safety integrity level, the device should be analysed from several 
aspects, namely: 
 The device safety architecture used and the hardware fault tolerance (HFT) 
 The effectiveness of the diagnostics and fraction of the safe failures from all fail-
ures (SFF)The complexity of the device (Type A/Type B) 
 Determining the operation mode of the device (Low demand/High demand mode) 
for using the relevant formulas for calculating PFDG/PFHG 
 Assessing the design process followed to prevent common cause failures (CCF) 
 
In IEC 61508, two different tables are given for Type A and Type B subsystems. These 
tables are shown below. (Table 4 and Table 5) 
 
Table 4 – Safety Integrity Level with Architecture for Type A Subsystems, reprinted from IEC 61508[2] 
Safe Failure 
Fraction 
Hardware Fault Tolerance 
0 1 2 
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3 
60% to <90% SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 4 
90% to <99% SIL 3 SIL 4 SIL 4 
≥ 99% SIL 3 SIL 4 SIL 4 
 
 
Table 5 – Safety Integrity Level with Architecture for Type B Subsystems, reprinted from IEC 61508[2] 
Safe Failure 
Fraction 
Hardware Fault Tolerance 
0 1 2 
< 60% 
Not al-
lowed 
SIL 1 SIL 2 
60% to <90% SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3 
90% to <99% SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 4 
≥ 99% SIL 3 SIL 4 SIL 4 
 
As can be seen from Tables 4 and 5, to be able to meet a specific safety integrity level, 
the device type must be determined first. Once the device type has been determined, 
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the safety architecture must be considered in order to get the HFT. Following, the rele-
vant SIL can be chosen according to the calculated SFF. 
 
In addition to above, the operation mode must be selected in order to use the relevant 
equations to calculate PFDG and/or PFHG. Some of the equations that can be used can 
be found in Tables 12 and 13. When PFDG and/or PFHG have been calculated, Table 6 
must be used to determine the safety integrity level that the device can meet. 
 
Table 6 – Low demand mode and continuos probabilities of failure, modified from IEC 61508[1] 
Safety Integrity 
Level (SIL) 
Low demand mode of operation 
 
(Average probability of failure to perform its design 
function on demand) 
High demand or continu-
ous mode of operation 
(Probability of dangerous failure per 
hour) 
4 ≥ 10−5 to < 10−4 ≥ 10−9 to < 10−8 
3 ≥ 10−4 to < 10−3 ≥ 10−8 to < 10−7 
2 ≥ 10−3 to < 10−2 ≥ 10−7 to < 10−6 
1 ≥ 10−2 to < 10−1 ≥ 10−6 to < 10−5 
 
In continuous mode and depending on the architecture, it might be required to assess 
the design process followed to prevent common cause failures in order to get the factors 
β and βD as discussed earlier. 
 
 
2.2.2 ISO 13849 and Performance Levels (PL) 
 
ISO 13849 is a safety standard that provides guidance for designing safety-related con-
trol systems. The standard presents the safety requirements to be fulfilled to achieve a 
certain performance level. 
 
Performance levels are classified into 5 categories with PL a offering the minimal risk 
reduction required and PL e with highest risk reduction. 
 
To meet a specific performance level, the device should be analysed from several as-
pects, namely: 
 The safety architecture used, denoted as Category in ISO 13849 
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 Mean Time to Dangerous Failure (MTTFD) 
 The average probability of failure per hour (PFHD) 
 The diagnostic coverage (DC) 
 
Several tables are provided in the standard for the classification of different performance 
levels. 
 
Table 7 below presents the classification of the performance levels according to PFHD. 
 
Table 7 – Performance Levels classification according to PFHD, reprinted from ISO 13849[3] 
PL 
Average probabil-
ity of failure per 
hour (PFHD) 1/h 
a ≥ 10−5 𝑡𝑜 < 10−4 
b ≥ 3 ∗ 10−6 𝑡𝑜 < 10−5 
c ≥ 10−6 𝑡𝑜 < 3 ∗ 10−6 
d ≥ 10−7 𝑡𝑜 < 10−6 
e ≥ 10−8 𝑡𝑜 < 10−7 
 
The standard provides a table for MTTFD classification. Table 8 below presents the three 
different denotations given for the MTTFD. These denotations are used later for deter-
mining the performance level. 
 
 
Table 8 – Mean time to dangerous failure of each channel (MTTFD), reprinted from ISO 13849[3] 
MTTFD 
Denotation  Range of each channel 
Low 3 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 ≤ 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐷 < 10 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 
Medium 10 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 ≤ 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐷 < 30 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 
High 30 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 ≤ 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐷 ≤ 100 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 
 
Similar to MTTFD table, additional table is given for Diagnostic Coverage with three dif-
ferent denotations presented in Table 9 below.   
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Table 9 – Diagnostic coverage (DC), reprinted from ISO 13849[3] 
DC 
Denotation Range 
None 𝐷𝐶 < 60% 
Low 60% ≤ 𝐷𝐶 < 90% 
Medium 90% ≤ 𝐷𝐶 < 99% 
High 99% ≤ 𝐷𝐶 
 
When DCavg, MTTFD have been calculated and the Category is known, Table 10 below 
can be used to determine the performance level. 
 
Table 10 – Evaluating achieved Performance Level, reprinted from ISO 13849[2] 
Category B 1 2 2 3 3 4 
DCavg None None Low Medium Low Medium High 
MTTFD of each 
channel 
 
Low a Not cov-
ered 
a b b c Not cov-
ered 
Medium b Not cov-
ered 
b c c d Not cov-
ered 
High Not cov-
ered 
c c d d d e 
 
 
 
2.3 Estimation of Required SIL and PL 
 
Risk graphs have been created to help in choosing the desired and/or required safety 
integrity level and performance level. These graphs account for the risk consequences, 
frequency and time of exposure to hazard/s, possibility of failing to avoid risk and the 
probability of the unwanted occurrence. 
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2.3.1 Estimation Method for Required SIL 
 
Figure 7 below presents the graph in accordance with IEC 61508 for choosing safety 
integrity level.  
 
Figure 7 – Risk Graph for estimation of required SIL, reprinted from IEC 61508[2] 
  
 
C = Consequence risk parameter 
C1 – Minor injury of a person  
C2 – Serious, irreversible injury of one or more  
         people or death of one person  
C3 – Death of several people 
C4 – Disastrous effect with several dead 
F = Frequency and exposure time risk parameter 
F1 – Rarely to slightly more often 
F2 – Frequently to continuously 
P = Possibility of failing to avoid hazard risk parameter 
P1 – Possible under certain conditions 
P2 – Almost impossible 
W = Probability of the unwanted occurrence 
W1 – Very small 
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W2 – Small 
W3 – Relatively high 
 
2.3.2 Estimation Method for Required PL 
 
Figure 8 below presents the graph in accordance with ISO 13849 for choosing perfor-
mance level. 
 
Figure 8 – Risk Graph for estimation of required PL, reprinted from ISO 13849[3] 
3 Safety System Architectures 
 
There are several architectures used in functional safety. This chapter will discuss and 
compare few of the commonly used ones. 
 
A generally used terminology in safety standards for architectures is “MooN” or “XooY”. 
- M out of N, X out of Y. 
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Most Safety Instrumented Systems are designed to de-energize the output when a dan-
gerous condition is detected. For the sake of simplicity, simple examples will be provided 
for better explaination of the different architectures. These examples will include supply 
voltage, switch/es and one LED. Turning off the LED when needed is assumed to be the 
safety function that this system provides. The main interest is/are the switch/es.  
 
Two failure modes are possible for each switch: 
1. The switch is stuck open 
2. The switch is stuck closed 
 
3.1 1oo1 Architecture 
 
This is the simplest and minimal system configuration possible. Failure of the one and 
only unit will cause the whole system to fail. This system offers no fault tolerance and 
therefore the HFT=0. In addition, no internal diagnostics are used, and thus no failure 
mode protection is present. 
 
Figure 9 illustrates a “safety system”. This setup is 1oo1 as we have only 1 switch that 
controls turning off the LED. Two different cases can be considered: 
 
1. The safety function should turn off the LED and the switch is stuck open. Safe 
failure 
2. The safety function should turn off the LED and the switch is stuck closed. Dan-
gerous failure 
 
Figure 9 – 1oo1 Architecture example 
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3.2 1oo1d Architecture 
 
This architecture expands the 1oo1 architecture by including a diagnostic channel. The 
addition of the diagnostics allows the conversion of dangerous detected failure into a 
safe failure [4]. 
 
3.3 1oo2 Architecture 
 
This architecture is widely used in designs requiring redundancy, hardware fault toler-
ance and the output de-energized for safe state. Two separate units with ability to per-
form the safety function are used. Failure of one unit doesn’t result in the failure of the 
system and thus HFT=1. In addition, no diagnostics are used. 
 
Figure 10 illustrates a safety system with 1oo2 architecture. Two switches in series are 
used with the ability of each one of them to turn off the L.E.D. 
 
Few failure cases can be considered: 
1. The safety function should turn off the LED and the 1st switch is stuck open, 
the 2nd switch is functioning properly. 
2. The safety function should turn off the LED and the 1st switch is stuck closed, 
the 2nd switch B is functioning properly. 
3. The safety function should turn off the LED and the 2nd switch is stuck open, 
the 1st switch is functioning properly. 
4. The safety function should turn off the LED and the 2nd switch is stuck closed, 
the 1st switch is functioning properly. 
5. The safety function should turn off the LED and both switches are stuck open. 
6. The safety function should turn off the LED and both switches are stuck 
closed. 
  
All these failures except the last failure would result in a safe failure. It can be clearly 
seen to reach a dangerous state, the two switches must fail and therefore the HFT=1. 
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Figure 10 – 1oo2 Architecture example 
 
3.4 1oo2d Architecture 
 
This architecture is similar to 1oo2 architecture with additional diagnostics unit between 
the two channels. The diagnostics unit cross-monitors the two channels continuously. In 
case of a faulty channel, inequality will be detected by the diagnostic unit, which will 
signalize this to the faultless channel in order to achieve a fail-safe state. 
 
If both systems fail independently due to a common cause fault, the system won’t be 
able to achieve safe state. For such cases, an external watchdog, temperature monitor-
ing and voltage monitoring are used [4]. 
 
3.5 2oo2 Architecture 
 
In this architecture two units are connected in parallel with the need of the two units to 
function properly for performing the safety function. This architecture doesn’t provide any 
hardware fault tolerance. 
 
Figure 11 illustrates a safety system with 2oo2 architecture. The safety function needs 
to turn off the L.E.D and the switches are normally closed during regular operation. 
 
Few failure cases can be considered: 
1. The safety function should turn off the LED and the upper switch is stuck 
open, the lower switch is functioning properly. Safe failure. 
2. The safety function should turn off the LED and the upper switch is stuck 
closed, the lower switch is functioning properly. Dangerous failure. 
3. The safety function should turn off the LED and the lower switch is stuck open, 
the upper switch is functioning properly. Safe failure. 
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4. The safety function should turn off the LED and the lower switch is stuck 
closed, the upper switch is functioning properly. Dangerous failure. 
5. The safety function should turn off the LED and both switches are stuck open. 
Safe failure. 
6. The safety function should turn off the LED and both switches are stuck 
closed. Dangerous failure. 
 
It can be clearly understood from above that in order to reach safe state both switches 
should be functioning properly or one switch should fail to the safe state while the other 
keeps functioning properly. This architecture has HFT=0. 
 
 
Figure 11 – 2oo2 Architecture example  
 
3.6 2oo2d Architecture 
 
This architecture consists of two 1oo1d subsystems connected in 2oo2 architecture. 
1oo1d architecture protects against dangerous failures when the diagnostics detect the 
failure. Connecting two 1oo1d architectures in parallel can be used to prevent shut-
downs. 
 
3.7 Comparison and Formulas 
 
Understanding different architectures and their capabilities is crucial during the design 
phase. IEC 61508 accounts for the HFT of the SIS as it plays a major role in the system 
ability reaching safe state in case of failure. Table 11 below lists the common architec-
tures used. Architectures with diagnostics, don’t offer additional HFT. Voting is another 
commonly used term when talking about architectures. Voting simply means the number 
of votes needed to reach a safe state. 
  
24 
 
Table 11 – Different architectures voting and HFT 
Architecture Voting HFT 
1001 1 0 
1001d 1 0 
1oo2 1 1 
1oo2d 1 1 
2oo2 2 0 
2oo2d 2 0 
 
IEC 61508 provides different formulas for different architectures when calculating PFDG 
and PFHG. These formulas are listed below in 2 separate tables with Table 12 providing 
the formulas used to calculate PFDG and Table 13 providing the formulas to calculate 
PFHG. 
 
Table 12 – Formulas to be used for Low Demand Mode according to IEC 61508 
Architecture Low Demand Mode 
1oo1 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐺 = (𝜆𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷) ∗ 𝑡𝑐𝑒 
 
𝑡𝐶𝐸 =
𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝜆𝐷
(
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇) +
𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝜆𝐷
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 
1oo2 
 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐺 = 2((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)
2
𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽𝐷𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽𝜆𝐷𝑈 (
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇) 
 
𝑡𝐶𝐸 =
𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝜆𝐷
(
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅) +
𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝜆𝐷
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 
 
𝑡𝐺𝐸 =
𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝜆𝐷
(
𝑇1
3
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇) +
𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝜆𝐷
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 
 
1oo2D 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐺 = 2(1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝑆𝐷)𝑡𝐶𝐸
′ + 𝑡𝐺𝐸
′ + 𝛽𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽𝜆𝐷𝑈 (
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇) 
 
𝑡𝐶𝐸
′ =
𝜆𝐷𝑈 (
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇) + (𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝑆𝐷)𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
𝜆𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝑆𝐷
 
 
𝑡𝐺𝐸
′ =
𝑇1
3
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇 
2oo2 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐺 = 2𝜆𝐷𝑡𝐶𝐸  
 
𝑡𝐶𝐸 =
𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝜆𝐷
(
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇) +
𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝜆𝐷
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 
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Table 13 – Formulas to be used for Continuous Mode according to IEC 61508 
Architecture Continuous mode (High demand) 
1oo1 𝑃𝐹𝐻𝐺 = 𝜆𝐷𝑈 
1oo2 
𝑃𝐹𝐻𝐺 = 2((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)(1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈𝑡𝐶𝐸 + 𝛽𝜆𝐷𝑈 
 
𝑡𝐶𝐸 =
𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝜆𝐷
(
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇) +
𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝜆𝐷
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 
 
1oo2D 
𝑃𝐹𝐻𝐺 = 2(1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + ((1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈 + (1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝑆𝐷)𝑡𝐶𝐸
′ + 2(1 − 𝐾)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝜆𝐷𝑈 
𝑡𝐶𝐸
′ =
𝜆𝐷𝑈 (
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇) + (𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝑆𝐷)𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
𝜆𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝑆𝐷
 
 
2002 𝑃𝐹𝐻𝐺 = 2𝜆𝐷𝑈 
 
4 Functional Safety Functions 
 
Safety functions are safety actions activated to avoid damage to persons, environment 
and material assets. Safety functions are meant to reduce risks and hazards that haven’t 
been eliminated. As per the standards, these safety functions have minimum require-
ments for the reliability. 
 
In this chapter, commonly used safety functions in the industry are presented. 
 
Before proceeding to the safety functions, it is necessary to understand the three cate-
gories of stop functions:  
 
 Stop category 0: an uncontrolled stop where power to the motor is removed 
immediately 
 
 Stop category 1: a controlled stop where the motor has power for stopping, after 
which the power is removed 
 
 Stop category 2: a controlled stop where the motor continues to have power. 
Stop category 0 and 1 definitions also apply to Emergency stop categories 
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4.1 Safe Torque off (STO) 
 
This safety function is the most common function used in drives nowadays. This function 
cuts the power to the motor preventing it from generating torque. This function can be 
used to prevent an unexpected start-up as well (POUS below). It is quite common to 
combine STO with other safety functions. In STO stop categories 0 and 1 are used.  
 
4.2 Safe Stop 1 (SS1) 
 
In Safe Stop 1 (SS1) stop category 1 is applied. The drive is stopped using a quick stop 
ramp and following, the STO and SBC (if used) are automatically activated after a pre-
defined time delay or a speed limit. 
 
4.3 Safe Stop Emergency (SSE) 
 
This safety function is mainly used for emergency stops. It can be configured to either 
execute STO or SS1 depending on the application and the need. 
 
4.4 Safe Brake Control (SBC) 
 
This safety function is mainly used with machines having an active load. The safety func-
tion provides an output signal that controls the activation of a mechanical holding brake.  
 
4.5 Safely Limited Speed (SLS) 
 
This safety function is used to prevent the motor from exceeding a defined speed limit. 
If the set speed is exceeded, the SLS safety function will activate STO or SSE. 
 
 
4.6 Safe Maximum Speed (SMS) 
 
This safety function is a variant of SLS safety function. SMS provides continuous moni-
toring of the maximum speed ensuring that the motor doesn’t exceed it. 
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4.7 Prevention of Unexpected Start-up (POUS) 
 
This safety function prevents the machine from starting accidentally by activating the 
STO safety function. 
 
4.8 Safe Speed Monitoring (SSM) 
 
This safety function is used to provide a safe output signal indicating whether the motor 
is rotating in a speed range defined by the user. 
 
4.9 Safe Direction (SDI) 
  
This safety function monitors the rotation direction of the motor. This function activates 
SSE in case the motor rotates to the wrong direction exceeding the user defined SDI 
tolerance limit. This safety function requires the use of an encoder. 
5 The PESTO Project 
 
In the PESTO project, a new safety device (FSB-21) is developed. This device combines 
the functionality of the FENA-21 and some of the functionalities of FSO-12.  
 
5.1 Ethernet Adapter Module (FENA-21)  
 
FENA-21 is a drive option that is compatible with different ABB drives and solar inverters. 
It is an Ethernet adapter module that supports different communication protocols such 
as PROFINET and PROFIsafe over PROFINET [5]. 
 
FENA-21 adapter module can be seen in Figure 12 below. 
28 
 
 
Figure 12 – FENA-21 Ethernet adapter module 
 
5.2 Functional Safety Option (FSO-12) 
 
FSO-12 is a drive option that is compatible with ABB ACS880 drives. It is a safety module 
that has safety inputs/outputs and provides the user with several safety functions, such 
as: STO, SLS, SSE, SBC, SMS and POUS. FSO-12 acts as a PROFIsafe termination 
point as well [6]. 
 
FSO-12 safety module can be seen in Figure 13 below. 
 
 
Figure 13 – FSO-12 safety module 
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5.3 Safety Module (FSB-21)  
 
As mentioned earlier, the FSB-21 combines the functionality of FENA-21 and some of 
the functionalities of FSO-12. FSB-21 supports basic PROFINET communication and 
PROFIsafe over PROFINET. The FSB-21 has only one safety function, STO. FSB-21 
offers a cheaper option for customers wanting to activate STO safety function over 
PROFIsafe while having the functionality of FENA-21.  
 
Before the development of FSB-21, to achieve similar behaviour, FENA-21 and FSO-12 
were required, resulting in a higher price solution. The FSB-21 doesn’t replace FSO-12 
as it provides only one safety function but it is a good and cheaper option for customers 
needing only STO safety function. The FSB-21 has a similar mechanical design as the 
FENA-21. It has a different colour and a STO connector though. 
 
5.3.1 FSB-21 System Overview 
 
Figure 14 presents the general structure of the system. The FSB-21 is connected to the 
drive (ACS380, ACS580, ACS880) using the F-option connector. This connector pro-
vides the main power to the FSB-21 (24V, 3.3V) and the communication between the 
drive and the module. This communication is non-safety related. 
 
 
Figure 14 – FSB-21 System Overview 
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Additional wires are required to connect the STO connector of the module to the drive. 
The power to the STO circuit is provided by the drive and it is isolated on the FSB-21. 
Some drives use three wires for the power and others use two wires. STO control con-
sists of two wires.  
 
The PLC/safety PLC is connected to the FSB-21 using the Ethernet connector. The FSB-
21 can be connected in a ring (as seen in Figure 15) and therefore a second Ethernet 
connector exists. 
 
 
Figure 15 – FSB-21 in a Ring Connection 
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5.3.2 FSB-21 Electronics 
 
Figure 16 presents a simplified block diagram of the module. The core of the FSB-21 is 
a safety microprocessor that has two cores running in lockstep mode. In addition to the 
safety microprocessor, an FPGA is used to handle the communication between the 
safety microprocessor and the PLC/safety PLC.  
 
 
Figure 16 – FSB-21 electronics 
 
As it is a safety module designed to perform to up to SIL3, some additional features are 
required, such as: voltage monitoring, temperature monitoring, clock monitoring and an 
external watchdog. The device has several diagnostics performed continuously to im-
prove the diagnostic coverage of dangerous failures.  
 
5.3.3 FSB-21 Safety Architecture 
 
In order to describe the architecture used in FSB-21, the safety instrumented system 
(SIS) should be explored. Figure 17 below illustrates the SIS of the FSB-21. 
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Figure 17  – FSB-21 Safety Architecture 
 
The input interface/sensor subsystem includes the communication path between the 
safety PLC and the microprocessor. This communication is handled in the analysis as a 
black channel. 
 
The logic subsystem includes the safety controller with 1oo1d architecture.  
 
The final element subsystem includes the two separate channels for STO control and 
thus, it is 1oo2 architecture. 
6 Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) 
 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a qualitative technique developed in the 
late 1950s by reliability engineers to study problems that might arise from malfunctions 
in military systems [7]. FMEA is used to identify all possible failures during the design 
phase of a new product. The technique addresses the failure modes, effects and analy-
sis: 
Failure modes: The possible ways of failure 
Effects: The effects of each failure on the system 
Analysis: Analyse the impact on the environment, people and the system 
 
Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (FEMDA) is a systematic analysis tech-
nique developed by exida engineers during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In addition 
to the qualitative approach of the FMEA, FMEDA added two additional pieces of infor-
mation: quantitative failure data and probability of failure detection [8].  
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A FMEDA is widely used in functional safety as it provides means for hardware assess-
ment to verify that the developed device meets the pre-determined safety requirements. 
While a FMEDA is very essential in the assessment of the safety integrity level and per-
formance level, it is not sufficient. For full assessment, all requirements of both stand-
ards, IEC 61508 and ISO 13849, must be considered. 
 
6.1 FMEDA Prerequisites 
 
Performing a FMEDA for electronics device requires several items and information. The 
necessary items, information, and their role in the FMEDA procedure are presented be-
low. 
 
Schematics –  
 Defining the safety related components among all components 
 Understanding the functionality of each component and the sys-
tem as a whole 
 Understanding the effects of failures of each component on the 
system 
 
Bill of materials –  
 Finding the exact components types 
 Finding the ratings of each component 
 Finding the package type of the component 
 
Layout –  
 Determining pins orientation 
 
PCB specifications report –  
 Getting the specification of the products’ PCBs that will be used 
later in determining PCBs failure rates 
 
Specification of the applied diagnostics –  
 Getting familiar with the applied diagnostics 
 Understanding the abilities of the diagnostics 
 
Datasheets of components –  
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 Getting any missing/required components ratings. 
 
 System architecture – 
 Determining the hardware fault tolerance 
 Determining the adequate analysis to be performed. (Is it enough 
to analyse 1 channel?)  
  
Type A/ Type B, Cat., Low demand/Continuous demand mode –  
 Determining the table to be followed 
 
IEC 62380 or equivalent –  
 Finding components’ failure modes 
 
Reliability data libraries –   
 Getting components’ failure rates 
 
Some examples of reliability data libraries: 
- Telcordia report SR332 
- TUV Nord Workbench (Based on Telcordia report SR332) 
- Texas Instruments Reliability Estimator  
- Altera (Intel) Reliability Report 
- Other manufactures reliability libraries 
 
MTTR, MTR and Proof test interval –  
 Determining required parameters to be used later in the equations 
 
Environmental conditions –  
 Determining the environmental conditions in which the device will 
be performing. 
 
Standards –  
 Getting guidance if needed 
 Getting the necessary tables and formulas to be used and fol-
lowed 
 
In this work, IEC 61508 and ISO 13849 were followed. 
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Spreadsheet tool or equivalent –  
 Providing an automated calculation process 
 
In this work, ABB’s Excel tool developed especially for FMEDA purposes was used. 
 
6.2 FMEDA Procedure 
 
A FMEDA is a systematic procedure and below are the necessary steps to perform it. 
 
1. Reading all relevant documents from the developing process of the device, in-
cluding the FMEA. 
2. Understanding in depth the electronic circuitry and the products functionality.  
3. Architecture, Cat., device type (Type A/Type B) and demand mode should be 
already known at this stage. 
4. Determining the values to be used for β and βd using the tables given in IEC 
61508 
5. Determining the environmental conditions in which the device will be functioning. 
6. Determining all other relevant parameters such as MTR, MTTR, and proof test 
interval (can be changed later if needed). 
7. Marking all safety-related components and pins (of the connectors) on the sche-
matics (Schematics required). If there are redundant channels as in 1oo2 archi-
tecture, it is enough to perform the analysis for the channel with the worst prob-
ability of failure. Similar approach shall be applied for connectors’ pins. 
8. With the bill of materials in hand, all necessary calculation for relevant connectors 
and PCBs shall be performed as explained in sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2. Connect-
ors’ datasheets, PCB specifications document/s and layout files are usually re-
quired to complete this step. 
9. All safety-related components with their specifications shall be added to the excel 
FMEDA tool part list. If the device is built from several PCBs, separate sheets 
shall be used. 
10. Failure modes and their probabilities for each component shall be added. Failure 
modes for connectors shall be performed as mentioned in section 6.3.2. IEC 
62380 is a source for most of the common components. 
11. FIT values shall be added for each component. For completing this work, TÜV 
(Technical Inspection Association) Nord workbench was mostly used. Other 
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sources such as Telcordia report can be used. FIT values for the connectors and 
PCBs are available after performing step 8. 
12. Diagnostic analysis can be started at this point. Each component’s failure modes 
shall be investigated with their effect on the whole system. The result of the failure 
shall be written. Each failure shall be classified whether it is safe/dangerous, de-
tected/undetected and to provide with detection percentage (0-99%) with reason-
able justification. 
13. The Excel FMEDA tool calculates the values for SD, SU, DD, and DU au-
tomatically. The calculations are rather simple. 
14. Relevant equations shall be used for every part of the SIS. If the sensor/input 
element has architecture of 1oo1, 1oo1 equations given in IEC 61508 are to be 
used.  
15. Results of all subsystem shall be added together to get the relevant values for 
the whole system 
16. The achieved results shall be compared to the tables given in the standards to 
determine safety integrity level (SIL) according IEC 61508 and performance level 
(PL) according to ISO 13849. 
17. The safety integrity level and PL level shall be compared to the pre-determined 
safety requirements. 
 
6.3 Failures of Components 
 
Different components fail in different ways. This section will present the factors taken into 
account when calculating failure rate for PCBs and connectors.   
 
6.3.1 PCB Failure Rate 
 
Various factors are considered when estimating the failure rate of a PCB. Board surface 
area, number of layers, holes, connections, tracks, track width and environmental factors 
are all taken into account. The technical report IEC 62380 [9] provides two formulas for 
calculating the failure rate of a PCB with formula A taking into account failure rates of 
components and connections and formula B taking into account the board itself. 
 
Following good engineering practises, PCB failures modes are classified as shown in 
Table 14 below. 
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Table 14 – PCBs failure modes 
Failure mode Probability 
Open circuit 20% 
Short circuit 80% 
 
6.3.2 Connectors Failure Rate 
 
Several factors are taken into account when estimating the failure rate of connectors. 
The following formula is provided in IEC 62380 for connectors [9]: 
 
𝜆 = 𝜆0  ×  𝜋𝑡 ×  𝜋𝑐 ×  𝜋𝑀  ×  𝜋𝑖  ×  (1 + 2.7 ×  10
−3  × [∑ (𝜋𝑛)𝑖 × (∆𝑇𝑖)
0.68𝑗
𝑖=1 ])  ×
10−9
ℎ
 (8) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒: 
𝜆0  − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 
𝜋𝑚 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 
𝜋𝑐  − 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠 
𝜋𝑖  − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝜋𝑖  − 𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝜋𝑡  − 𝐴𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 
 
Connectors have two failure modes. These failures modes and their probabilities are 
presented in Table 15 and Table 16 below. 
 
Table 15 – Failure modes for one-row connectors 
Failure mode Probability 
Open circuit 60% 
2-pins shorted 40% 
 
 
Table 16 – Failure modes for two rows connectors 
Failure mode Probability 
Open circuit 60% 
2-pins shorted 35% 
3-pins shorted 5% 
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6.4 FSB-21 FMEDA 
 
FSB-21 will generally be used in continuous (high demand) mode. Due to customer re-
quests, the safety module will be analysed also for low demand mode with 2 different 
proof test intervals.  
 
As discussed earlier in 6.3.3, the sensor/signal element of the FSB-21, which provides 
the communication path between the safety PLC and the FSB-21, falls under the defini-
tion of black channel and therefore will be excluded from the FMEDA. 
 
The logic solver of the FSB-21 consists of the safety MCU with 1oo1d architecture and 
is considered as Cat. 3. The final element consists of the STO control channels that are 
designed in 1oo2 architecture and is considered as Cat. 3 as well. FSB-21 is type B 
device as a result of the complex electronics used. 
 
Before proceeding to FMEDA process, few parameters are defined: 
 
 MTTR = 48 hours, the safety device is not repairable and the customer will 
receive a new replacement device within two days. 
 MTR = 0 hours, the safety device is not repairable. 
 Proof test interval, T1 = 17520 hours (2 years), T2 = 43800 hours (5 years).  In 
continuous mode, T1 is used. In low demand mode, two cases will be ana-
lysed, one with T1 and the other with T2. 
 Environmental conditions:  
o Ambient temperature: tA = 40 °C  
o Temperature variation amplitude: tae = 45 °C, tac = 
85 °C (used for connectors and PCBs) 
 
Now that the basic parameters have been defined, the FMEDA process can be started. 
 
6.4.1 FSB-21 β and βD 
 
To determine the values to be used for β and βD, the tables given in IEC 61508-6 are 
used. In Appendix 1, the argumentation for the values determined can be found. 
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The achieved values are: 
β = 5% 
βD = 2% 
 
6.4.2 FSB-21 Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) 
 
FSB-21 is constructed from 2 PCBs assembled on top of each other with several con-
nections between them. The upper PCB has the safety MCU (logic solver) and is treated 
as 1oo1d architecture. The lower PCB has the STO control electronics and is treated as 
1oo2 architecture. 
 
Figure 18 below shows the parameters taken into account when calculating the failure 
rate of PCBs as well as the achieved failure rate (in FIT). These calculations were per-
formed using ABB Excel FMEDA tool. 
 
Figure 18 – PCBs calculations performed in ABB Excel FMEDA tool 
 
6.4.3 FSB-21 Connectors  
 
The FSB-21 has six connectors from which three are safety related and will be taken into 
account in the FMEDA. Two connectors are used to connect the PCBs together (male 
and female connectors) and one connector for the STO output. 
 
All these connectors have only one safety related pin per analysed channel, which is 
used for the STO control. There are two channels for the STO control, and the channel 
with the greater probability of failures will be used in the analysis.  
 
Figure 19 below shows the connectors’ parameters used in performing the calculations 
as well as the achieved failures rates (in FIT). These calculations were performed using 
ABB Excel FMEDA tool. 
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Figure 19 – Connecters’ parameters used in the ABB Excel FMEDA tool 
 
6.4.4 FSB-21 Logic Solver 
 
The safety MCU used in FSB-21 was analysed using the tool provided by Texas Instru-
ments for this specific MCU. This tool aids exceptionally in the FMEDA process. Final 
results achieved using the tool can be seen in Figure 20 below. 
 
 
Figure 20 – FMEDA results for the safety MCU using Texas Instruments FMEDA tool 
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6.4.5 FSB-21 Final Element 
 
The Final Element on the FSB-21 consists of two channels used for STO control. As it is 
2 channels architecture, it is enough to analyse only one channel. The schematic in Fig-
ure 21 below shows all safety related components taken into account. In Appendix 2, 
failure rates and modes for the final element are shown.  
 
 
Figure 21 – STO Control Circuit 
 
6.5 Fault Insertion Test 
 
To verify the results achieved in the FMEDA, fault insertion test has to be carried out. In 
fault insertion, all dangerous failures are normally tested. In addition, some random safe 
failures are tested as well as some other components that might be applicable to test. 
 
In the fault insertion test, the failures are injected to the device under test and the con-
sequences are observed. 
 
In addition to validating the results achieved in the FMEDA, fault insertion can validate 
the implemented diagnostic tests and the independence between safety-related and 
non-safety-related components. 
 
In order to perform fault insertion, the device shall be near finished, as the safety FW is 
required for the diagnostics of the faults. Due to this, fault insertion testing is out of the 
scope of this work. 
 
42 
 
7 Results and Conclusion 
 
During the design phase of a safety product, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
procedure is performed to determine safety requirements and to help designers under-
stand possible failures to be avoided by good engineering practices. When the design 
phase is completed, Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) proce-
dure is performed. FMEDA validates the conformance of the implementation with regards 
to the design goals. Exact probabilities of different failures are an outcome of the 
FMEDA. Fault insertion test validates the results achieved in the FMEDA. 
 
FMEDA is a systematic process and the complexity lies in understanding and interpreting 
the standards to be followed, which in this work were IEC 61508 and ISO 13849. 
 
The goal of this work was to perform Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis for 
the FSB-21. The FMEDA process for FSB-21 was performed successfully and the results 
are shown in Figure 22 below.  
 
 
Figure 22 – FSB-21 FMEDA final results 
 
As can be seen from Figure 22, the safety module achieved PFDavg = 2.27E-4 with 2 
years proof test interval and PFDavg = 5.5E-4 with 5 years test interval. Neither of these 
results prevents the module from achieving SIL 3 according to IEC 61508. PFH = 2.24E-
8 with 2 years proof test interval and SFF=99.2% giving the module SIL 3 according to 
IEC 61508. The safety module can be used in both low and continuous (high demand) 
modes with safety integrity level up to 3. 
 
It can be seen as well that DC = 98.26% and MTTFD = 83.75 years and therefore the 
safety module is capable of achieving PL e according to ISO 13849 from the safety reli-
ability perspective. 
 
To sum up, the safety module met the pre-determined safety requirements that were 
assigned during the design phase and further improvements will be made as a result of 
the FMEDA. 
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Failure rates and modes for FSB-21 Final Element 
 
